Recommendation 4.3: Prohibit and regulate tools and tactics with a high risk of death or injury that are disproportionate to the threat.

Many officers want specific guidance — or “rules of the road” — about acceptable uses and applications of force. Community members also want a clear sense of how officers should perform. Because courts have not provided much guidance, departments should step in. Policies and training should explicitly prohibit or limit uses of force that carry a high risk of death or injury when they are unwarranted because they are disproportionate to the threat. Clear rules, with clear exceptions, ensure that officers know in advance which force responses, tools, and techniques are prohibited under most or all circumstances. Specifically, departments should:

Prohibit maneuvers that restrict blood or oxygen flow to the brain. Chokeholds, strangleholds, neck restraints, neckholds, and carotid artery restraints are lethal hands-on maneuvers that cut off the supply of blood and oxygen to the brain. There is widespread support for banning these maneuvers, especially in the wake of the death of Eric Garner. In 2014, a New York City officer was recorded wrapping his arm around Garner’s neck and wrestling him to the ground (in violation of department policy) while he pleaded that he could not breathe.[i]

Recognizing the inherent danger of chokeholds and the threat they pose to human life, departments such as New York, Atlanta, and Miami prohibit them. Other states and cities have outlawed them too. Washington, D.C., bans chokeholds (but allows “strangleholds” in some situations) and Illinois prohibits them unless deadly force is justified.[ii]

Prohibit techniques and modes of transport that risk suffocation. Positional asphyxia (i.e., suffocation) occurs when people are restrained behind their backs and placed on their stomachs. Restraints include the hobble restraint, or “hog-tie,” by which officers tie people’s ankles with a strap and connect it to handcuffs.[iii]Positioning people on their stomachs while they are restrained can make it difficult to breathe and can result in death.[iv]Officers should be trained to not restrain people who are face-down and lying flat and to get handcuffed or restrained people off of their stomachs as quickly as possible.[v]Instructors should train officers not to apply pressure to people’s backs while restraining them in face-down positions and handcuffing them, because doing so compresses the airway and risks suffocation.[vi]

Prohibit officers from shooting at or from moving vehicles. This policy should apply except when drivers or passengers use or threaten imminent lethal force with weapons other than their vehicles.[vii]The Denver Police Department prohibits shooting at moving vehicles because doing so does not necessarily stop vehicles and can disable drivers, causing them to lose control and endanger the lives of passengers, bystanders, and officers.[viii]The department also prohibits officers from creating circumstances that might make shooting at a vehicle necessary,[ix]such as entering into or obstructing a vehicle’s path. This practice can be expensive. Some people have sued cities for deaths caused by officers shooting at moving vehicles, and city officials have opted to settle for large sums of money to avoid long and expensive litigation.[x]

Bans on shooting at or from vehicles have been extremely effective. The New York Police Department banned shooting at moving vehicles more than 45 years ago, causing officer shootings to plummet. Within the first year, the number of officer-involved shootings declined by 33 percent.[xi]Officer deaths in the line of duty also decreased during this time, indicating that the policy does not jeopardize officer safety.[xii]In short, this policy saves lives and reduces liability for cities and departments.[xiii]

Set clear guidelines for vehicle pursuits. High-speed police car chases are inherently dangerous, especially in urban areas and on densely populated streets, where they pose serious risk of injury to other drivers, passengers, and bystanders.[xiv]Indeed, a 2015 analysis of police car chases found that more than 5,000 passengers and bystanders have been killed by them since 1979, and tens of thousands more have been injured.[xv]What’s more, most pursuits involve minor offenses: A report by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the National Institute of Justice found that 92 percent of pursuits were initiated for traffic violations, misdemeanors, or non-violent felonies.[xvi]

Departments should provide clear parameters dictating when officers may initiate a vehicle pursuit. For example, the Seattle Police Department prohibits pursuits solely in response to traffic violations, civic infractions, misdemeanor offenses, property crimes, or for the sole reason of eluding an officer (e.g., by increasing speed or refusing to stop).[xvii]Officers should also end pursuits when the risk outweighs the need to stop the driver. Factors to consider include the original reason for the pursuit, location, direction of travel, weather conditions, speed (of the eluding driver), and traffic conditions, such as the presence of pedestrians and other vehicles.[xviii]Officers should also be required to notify their supervisors after vehicle pursuits, and departments should not discipline officers who refuse to initiate them.[xix]

Set clear guidelines for foot pursuits. People of color and people who live in high-crime areas may wish to avoid contact with an officer — even if they are not involved in criminal activity. Many factors may motivate an innocent person to flee, such as the fear of police use of force, a natural dislike of authority, past negative interactions with police officers, or fear of wrongful accusation, particularly among Black people because of their difficult history with police[xx]Officers often respond on foot, which is inherently dangerous and often ends in officer-involved shootings.[xxi]Perception problems also occur during foot pursuits; officers may think someone who makes a quick or sudden movement is reaching for a weapon and shoot them.[xxii]Officers also often experience fatigue and/or an adrenaline rush when pursuing people, which can compromise their tactical abilities and judgment.[xxiii]Foot pursuits by solo officers without back up are especially dangerous and often result in injury because officers may have to resort to force.

Departments should provide clear guidance and training about how to safely engage in foot pursuits. Doing so will reduce the incidence of injury and death to the public and officers alike. Policies should specify when foot pursuits are warranted and limit them to when officers have probable cause that someone has committed crime; mere flight, in other words, is not enough.[xxiv]In its model policy, the IACP makes a series of recommendations on foot pursuits, including that officers end foot pursuits when they are alone or lose the person; when the person enters a building or other structure; when they lose communication with dispatch; when they know they can apprehend the person at another time; or when they lose their sense of direction or location.[xxv]

Prohibit water cannons and acoustic weapons, and restrict gas, for crowd-control purposes. Water cannons, fire hoses, and tear gas (along with other uses of force, including dogs, whips, and batons) were used during the civil rights movement not only to control crowds but also to scare, intimidate, and injure demonstrators.[xxvi]Despite their risk of injury and intimidation, these instruments and tactics, though rare, are still used today.

In 2016, police used water cannons, tear gas, and lead-filled beanbags against peaceful protestors from the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in North Dakota, which resulted in mass injuries, including fractured bones and hypothermia.[xxvii]Acoustic weapons are also used to control crowds, as was the case in Ferguson, Missouri, where officers used them against people who were protesting the fatal police shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teen, by delivering painful blasts of noise, whch can cause permanent damage and potential hearing loss.[xxviii]More recently, the U.S. Border Patrol fired tear gas at a group of migrants, including young children, who were attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.[xxix]

While these weapons are rarely used by police officers in the United States, they fuel outrage when they are. They induce fear, turn police encounters into war-like scenarios, and carry a high risk of injury and therefore should not be used to control crowds, including against people engaging in lawful protests and other activities protected by the First Amendment. (For more detail, see Chapter 6.)

Water cannons shoot pressurized water (sometimes mixed with chemical agents or dyes) through hoses that are connected to in-ground water supplies or to “bladders” mounted on top of vehicles. They can cause internal injuries and hypothermia (when used in colder climates) and other injuries from slipping and falling or exposure to chemicals and dyes.^[xxx]Departments should ban their use for crowd-control purposes as they are ineffective and cause injury. Indeed, in 2015, England banned them because they haven’t proven a safe or effective crowd control tool.[xxxi]

Tear gas is a chemical that irritates eyes, causes skin pain, interferes with breathing, and disorients and agitates people.[xxxii]It can be sprayed at people or thrown grenade-like into crowds, where it “explodes” with gas.[xxxiii]Like pepper spray, tear gas cannot be targeted when sprayed; as such, it carries a high risk of affecting unintended targets or bystanders.[xxxiv]When tear gas canisters explode, the gas disperses widely to surrounding areas.[xxxv]For these reasons, departments should restrict the use of tear gas to situations in which crowds engage in violent acts, such as riots, that risk death or serious injury and all other options have been exhausted. The use of tear gas should require approval from highest level of the department, (i.e., from the chief or commissioner).

Like tear gas. acoustic weapons are indiscriminate; they can’t be targeted at specific individuals and can harm bystanders and other officers.[xxxvi]They’re primarily “pain compliance” tools that can cause lasting physical impairment. Departments should ban their use as they have not been proven to be an effective method of crowd control.[xxxvii]

Limit acquisition of military equipment and end militarized police responses. Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Defense has transferred some $6 billion worth of excess military equipment to law enforcement agencies through its 1033 Program, so named for a section of the National Defense Authorization Act.[xxxviii]Under the program, local police departments can acquire armored vehicles, including Humvees and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which were designed to withstand explosive ambushes in combat zones. They can also acquire military grade weapons, such as high-caliber assault weapons, grenade launchers, and other equipment.

This program has been in effect for decades but only recently attracted national scrutiny. In 2014, the Ferguson (Missouri) Police Department used this type of equipment in response to widespread protests following the fatal shooting of Michael Brown.[xxxix]Images of officers in MRAPs, body armor, and gas masks confronting protesters and of snipers perched on top of tactical vehicles[xl]spread around the world — and recalled images of excessive uses of force against protesters during the civil rights movement.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation into the Ferguson Department’s response to the protests, and President Obama issued an executive order directing a working group to review programs that supply military equipment to police.[xli]In 2015, the DOJ concluded that the heavily armed, militarized response was disproportionate to the threat posed by the protestors and deployed in a manner that intimidated the community.[xlii]

The working group subsequently recommended prohibiting acquisition of military equipment including tracked armored and weaponized vehicles, bayonets, grenade launchers, and high-caliber firearms and ammunition.[xliii]In 2017, the Trump administration revoked the order and disavowed the recommendations,[xliv]yet they nonetheless serve as a guide and confirm that the significant risk of misusing or overusing military weapons, which undermines community trust, warrants their prohibition.[xlv]

Indeed, evidence shows that militarization influences police behavior. One study found a correlation between military equipment and the number of police-involved killings.[xlvi]Access to military equipment also increases officers’ tendency to use military tactics (i.e., force) to resolve conflicts.[xlvii]The massive transfer of such equipment to local departments is tantamount to arming officers for war against communities.

That said, while military-grade equipment should not be used against members of the public, especially when engaging in lawful protests, it maybe appropriate in limited, high-risk situations, such as hostage rescues, special operations, terrorist attacks, active shooters, and fugitive apprehension. These situations may require heavy riot gear and powerful weapons to protect public and officer safety.[xlviii]

Limit the use of SWAT teams. Departments historically used Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams to handle hostage rescues, active shooters, and terrorist attacks. Today, SWAT teams are routinely used to execute search warrants, often for drug searches.[xlix]Officers on SWAT teams receive military-style training and use weapons such as battering rams and flashbang grenades (which can blind or deafen people), to break into homes.[l]

Somesearch warrants for drugs are high-risk and may warrant the use of SWAT teams. Yet the shift from their original use calls for careful evaluation of SWAT programs to determine whether they are being used appropriately after careful threat assessments. SWAT teams should be used for warrant service only when officers can show the existence of an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or harm, such that officers would be unable to execute a warrant safely without SWAT assistance. Department leaders should provide guidance on the types of warrant searches that justify the SWAT deployment and reasonable tactics when serving high-risk warrants.[li]When executing a warrant each action taken (for example, using a battering ram to enter after a knock-and-announce fails), each action or use of force should be justified.SWAT teams, and officers in other units who also execute warrants, need ongoing specialized training to reduce use of force.[lii]

No knock warrants are an especially high-risk tactic and they should be the exception not the rule. Only when a threat exists that officers can specifically articulate, should they be used.

Prohibit retaliatory and punitive uses of force. Though typically used in response to a legitimate threat of serious injury or death, force is sometimes used as a punitive measure. Officers might use retaliatory force when someone appears confrontational or records an officer with a cell phone video camera (which is generally permissible under the First Amendment).[liii]Departments should explicitly prohibit retaliatory and punitive force,[liv]especially against people who are handcuffed or restrained and therefore pose no threat.

[i]Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for the Police, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html.

[ii]D.C. Code §§ 5-125.01-125.03, https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/titles/5/chapters/1/subchapters/XIII/;720 Ill. Comp. Stat.5 § 7-5.5, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?DocName=072000050K7-5.5.

[iii]See, e.g.,Carmen Best, Chief of Police, Seattle Police Dep’t Manual, § 8.300 – Use of Force Tools, Seattle.gov (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8—use-of-force/8300—use-of-force-tools.

[iv]Nat’l Law Enf’t Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death 1 (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/posasph.pdf.

[v]Nat’l Law Enf’t Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death 2 (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/posasph.pdf.

[vi]Nat’l Law Enf’t Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death 1-2 (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/posasph.pdf.

[vii]Police Exec. Res. Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force 44 (2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf;see, e.g.,Denver Police Dep’t, Operations Manual 105.05 (2015), http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/site36/2015/0609/20150609_081455_OMS-105-05_APPROVED_06-08-15.pdf.

[viii]Denver Police Dep’t, Operations Manual 105.05 (2015), http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/site36/2015/0609/20150609_081455_OMS-105-05_APPROVED_06-08-15.pdf; Michael Roberts, Denver Cops Change Shooting-at-Moving-Vehicles Policy After Hernandez Decision, Westord, (June 9, 2015, 7:29am), https://www.westword.com/news/denver-cops-change-shooting-at-moving-vehicles-policy-after-hernandez-decision-6788874;Police Exec. Res. Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force 45 (2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.

[ix]Denver Police Dep’t, Operations Manual 105.05 (2015), http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/site36/2015/0609/20150609_081455_OMS-105-05_APPROVED_06-08-15.pdf.

[x]See, e.g., Noelle Phillips & Jon Murray, Denver Will Pay $1 Million to Jessica Hernandez’s Family for 2015 Fatal Shooting, Denver Post (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/04/12/jessica-hernandez-2015-fatal-police-shooting-settlement/;Bobby Allyn, Record $4.4M settlement in 2014 Philadelphia police shooting, WHYY (Jan. 6, 2017), https://whyy.org/articles/record-44m-settlement-in-2014-philadelphia-police-shooting/.

[xi]Police Exec. Res. Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force 45-46 (2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.

[xii]Police Exec. Res. Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force 47 (2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf.

[xiii]See, e.g., Michael Harriot, How 1 of America’s Deadliest Police Forces Gets Away With Shooting and Killing Black People, The Root (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.theroot.com/how-one-of-americas-deadliest-police-forces-gets-away-w-1803142042(discussing Kansas City’s 4.8 million settlement); Bobby Allyn, Record $4.4M settlement in 2014 Philadelphia police shooting, WHYY (Jan. 6, 2017), https://whyy.org/articles/record-44m-settlement-in-2014-philadelphia-police-shooting/;Finch McCranie LLP, $2.3 Million Judgement In Excessive Force Case, http://finchmccranie.com/2-3-million-judgement-in-excessive-force-case/(discussing a $2.3 million judgment in Gainesville, Georgia); Rick Orlov, City OKs Devin Brown Payout, L.A. Daily News (June 8, 2006)(discussing a $1.5 million settlement in Los Angeles), https://www.dailynews.com/2006/06/08/city-oks-devin-brown-payout.

[xiv]Christopher Ingraham, Police Chases Kill More People Each Year than Floods, Tornadoes, Hurricanes and Lightning — combined, Wash. Post (July 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/25/why-police-shouldnt-chase-criminals/?utm_term=.b4753153b304.

[xv]Thomas Frank, High-Speed Police Chases Have Killed Thousands of Innocent Bystanders, USA Today (July 30, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/30/police-pursuits-fatal-injuries/30187827/.

[xvi]Thomas Frank, High-speed police chases have killed thousands of innocent bystanders, USA Today (July 30, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/30/police-pursuits-fatal-injuries/30187827/(citing a report by the Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police and the Nat’l Inst. of Just.).

[xvii]Carmen Best, Chief of Police, Seattle Police Dep’t Manual, § 13.031– Vehicle Eluding/Pursuits (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-13—vehicle-operations/13031—vehicle-eluding/pursuits.

[xviii]Carmen Best, Chief of Police, Seattle Police Dep’t Manual, § 13.031– Vehicle Eluding/Pursuits (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-13—vehicle-operations/13031—vehicle-eluding/pursuits.

[xix]Carmen Best, Chief of Police, Seattle Police Dep’t Manual, § 13.031– Vehicle Eluding/Pursuits (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-13—vehicle-operations/13031—vehicle-eluding/pursuits.

[xx]SeeMiles v. United States, No. 13-CF-1523, at 17, 18 n.14 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2018) (concluding that the suspect’s flight from police was not sufficient corroboration to establish the reliability of “the anonymous tip” justifying the investigatory stop of a Black man), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/13-CF-1523.pdf. Fear of police among Blacks likely stems from negative interactions that disproportionately impact the communities of color. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

[xxi]See Robert J. Kaminski & Jeff Rojek, Police foot-pursuit policies, practices and training: Findings from a national survey 3 (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280829775_Police_foot-pursuit_policies_practices_and_training_Findings_from_a_national_survey(citing studies revealing that 12% of fatal police-involved shootings in Dekalb County involved foot pursuits); Merrick J. Bobb, The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 19th Semiannual Report 6 (2005) (stating that between 1997 and 2002, 22% of officer-involved shooting in Los Angeles involved foot pursuits, and from 2003-2004, 27% of such shootings involved foot pursuits), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0021-0001.pdf; Tony Plohetski, Dangerous pursuit: Austin police foot chases can lead to injuries, shootings, Austin American-Statesman (Sept. 8, 2013) (reporting that since 2008, over 30% of police shootings in Austin involved foot pursuits), https://www.statesman.com/news/20130908/dangerous-pursuit-austin-police-foot-chases-can-lead-to-injuries-shootings.

[xxii]Police Exec. Res. Forum, An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force 36 (2012), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/an%20integrated%20approach%20to%20de-escalation%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202012.pdf.

[xxiii]SeeU.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. Rights Div. & U.S. Atty’s Office N.D. Ill., Investigation of the Chicago Police Department 26 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download.

[xxiv]See, e.g., New Orleans Police Dep’t Operations Manual, Foot Pursuits 1 (2015), https://nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/NOPD-Consent-Decree/Chapter-41-4-Foot-Pursuits-(1).pdf/(stating that police and public safety “shall be the primary consideration when determining whether officers should initiate or continue a foot pursuit”);see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. Rights Div. & U.S. Atty’s Office N.D. Ill., Investigation of the Chicago Police Department 151 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download(recommending that the Chicago Police Department “[d]evelop, train and implement a foot pursuit policy that makes clear that foot pursuits are dangerous and that sets forth guidelines for foot pursuits that balance the objective of apprehending the suspect with the risk of potential injury to the officer, the public, and the suspect.”); see alsoTennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”).

[xxv]Robert J. Kaminski & Jeff Rojek, Police foot-pursuit policies, practices and training: Findings from a national survey 4-5 (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280829775_Police_foot-pursuit_policies_practices_and_training_Findings_from_a_national_survey.

[xxvi]SeeSteven Levingston, Children Have Changed America Before, Braving Fire Hoses and Police Dogs for Civil Rights, Wash. Post (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/02/20/children-have-changed-america-before-braving-fire-hoses-and-police-dogs-for-civil-rights/?utm_term=.dfea668465f3.

[xxvii]Julia Carrie Wong, Dakota Access pipeline: 300 Protesters Injured after Police Use Water Cannons, The Guardian (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/dakota-access-pipeline-water-cannon-police-standing-rock-protest.

[xxviii]See Lily Hay Newman, This Is the Sound Cannon Used Against Protesters in Ferguson, Slate (Aug. 14, 2014), https://slate.com/technology/2014/08/lrad-long-range-acoustic-device-sound-cannons-were-used-for-crowd-control-in-ferguson-missouri-protests.html.

[xxix]Alan Yuhas, U.S. Agents Fire Tear Gas Across Mexican Border, N.Y. Times (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/world/americas/migrants-border-tear-gas.html.

[xxx]Physicians for Human Rights, Water Cannons 1-2, https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_other/PHR_INCLO_Fact_Sheets_Water_Cannons.pdf.

[xxxi]Sanya Mansour, England, Wales Ban Water Cannon Use by Police. How Do UK Police Tactics Compare Globally? Christian Sci. Monitor (July 15, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2015/0715/England-Wales-ban-water-cannon-use-by-police.-How-do-UK-police-tactics-compare-globally.

[xxxii]Physicians for Human Rights & Int’l Network of Civ. Liberties Orgs., Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons 7 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/lethal_in_disguise_inclo_single_page.pdf.

[xxxiii]Physicians for Human Rights & Int’l Network of Civ. Liberties Orgs., Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons 41 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/lethal_in_disguise_inclo_single_page.pdf.

[xxxiv]Physicians for Human Rights & Int’l Network of Civ. Liberties Orgs., Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons 43 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/lethal_in_disguise_inclo_single_page.pdf.

[xxxv]Physicians for Human Rights & Int’l Network of Civ. Liberties Orgs., Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons 41 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/lethal_in_disguise_inclo_single_page.pdf.

[xxxvi]Physicians for Human Rights & Int’l Network of Civ. Liberties Orgs., Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons 74, 76 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/lethal_in_disguise_inclo_single_page.pdf.

[xxxvii]Physicians for Human Rights & Int’l Network of Civ. Liberties Orgs., Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons 74, 76 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/lethal_in_disguise_inclo_single_page.pdf.

[xxxviii]SeeAaron C. Davenport et al., An Evaluation of the Department of Defense’s Excess Property Program xi (2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2464.html. The 1033 Program, also known as the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) Program, is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense; the program was created by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997. Id.See alsoNiall McCarthy, How Much Is The Military Equipment Transferred To Law Enforcement Worth?, Forbes (May 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/05/29/how-much-is-the-military-equipment-transferred-to-law-enforcement-worth-infographic/#19187b863718.

[xxxix]David Nakamura & Niraj Chokshi, Obama Orders Review of Military Equipment Supplied to Police, Wash. Post (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-orders-review-of-military-equipment-supplied-to-police/2014/08/23/6316b8aa-2b03-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.256ec02c1b97.

[xl]See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., After Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson Missouri 60 (2015), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf.

[xli]Exec. Order No. 13,688, Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451 (Jan 16, 2015),https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-01-22/pdf/2015-01255.pdf.

[xlii]U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., After Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson Missouri 60 (2015), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf;see alsoDavid Nakamura & Niraj Chokshi, Obama orders review of military equipment supplied to police, The Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-orders-review-of-military-equipment-supplied-to-police/2014/08/23/6316b8aa-2b03-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.256ec02c1b97; Nakamura & Chokshi, supranote 88; Niraj Chokshi,Militarized Police in Ferguson Unsettles Some, Pentagon Gives Cities Equipment, Wash. Post(Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/militarized-police-in-ferguson-unsettles-some-pentagon-gives-cities-equipment/2014/08/14/4651f670-2401-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bfd3eed5c7b8.

[xliii]Law Enforcement Equipment Working Group, Recommendations Pursuant to Executive Order 13688: Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition 12-13 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/publications/LEEWG_Report_Final.pdf.

[xliv]Exec. Order No. 13,809, Restoring State, Tribal, and Local Law Enforcement’s Access to Life-Saving Equipment and Resources, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-08-31/pdf/2017-18679.pdf.

[xlv]Law Enforcement Equipment Working Group, Recommendations Pursuant to Executive Order 13688: Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition 13 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/publications/LEEWG_Report_Final.pdf.

[xlvi]Casey Delehanty et al., Militarization and police violence: The case of the 1033 program, Res. & Pol., June 2017, at 3, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017712885.

[xlvii]Casey Delehanty et al., Militarization and police violence: The case of the 1033 program, Res. & Pol., June 2017, at 2, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017712885.

[xlviii]SeeLaw Enforcement Equipment Working Group, Recommendations Pursuant to Executive Order 13688: Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition 6 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/publications/LEEWG_Report_Final.pdf.

[xlix]Am. Civ. Liberties Union, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing 31-32 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14-warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf(citingPeter Kraska, Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, Policing 6-7 (2007)).

[l]Am. Civ. Liberties Union, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing 31-32 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14-warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf;see alsoRadley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop, Wall St. J. (Aug. 7, 2013).

[li]See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-CV-1924-SM, ¶ 70–75 (E.D. La. July 24, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/11/07/nopd_consentdecree_7-24-12.pdf; Am. Civ. Liberties Union, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing 41 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14-warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf(recommending SWAT “only if the police can demonstrate, before deployment, that ordinary law enforcement officers cannot safely execute a warrant without facing an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.”).

[lii]See, e.g., New Orleans Police Dep’t, Operations Manual: Crisis Response Unit—SWAT (2017), https://www.nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/Policies/Chapter-46-7-Crisis-Response-Unit.pdf/.

[liii]See, e.g., Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017) (asserting that the Third Circuit joins the “growing consensus” among federal circuit courts that “the First Amendment protects the act of photographing, filming, or otherwise recording police officers conducting their official duties in public.”).

[liv]See Carmen Best, Chief of Police, Seattle Police Dep’t Manual, § 8.200 – Using Force, Seattle.gov (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8—use-of-force/8200—using-force(prohibiting officers from using physical force as punishment or retaliation or on a restrained person “except in exceptional circumstances when the subject’s actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury, or escape, destruction of property”).