Data collection allows communities and departments to analyze the effects of policies and practices, and to change them if they are ineffective or disproportionately affect particular communities.
Introduction
Transparency — like procedural justice and collaborative change — is a value that departments should accept and embrace. This chapter focuses on two primary topics related to transparency: data collection and body-worn cameras (BWCs). Both allow people in and outside of police departments to evaluate police activity and hold officers and departments accountable for their actions. Data collection allows communities and departments to analyze the effects of policies and practices, and to change them if they are ineffective or disproportionately affect particular communities. Video footage can increase transparency by providing first-hand evidence of interactions with members of the public.[i]
Indeed, without video footage, communities would never have known that, contrary to police reports, Laquan McDonald was walking awayfrom officers when he was shot 16 times.[ii]But accountability is not automatic without policies to ensure officers follow the proper protocols for data collection and BWC use; without safeguards in place, BWCs threaten constitutional rights and could intensify surveillance of communities of color, certain religious communities, or immigrants groups. (Please note: While this chapter refers mostly to BWCs, the recommendations below also apply to “dashcams” and other recording devices.)
Robust data collection and reporting allow communities and department leaders to evaluate policies and practices and to modify or eliminate those that are ineffective or have unintended negative consequences.[iii]Departments should notshare sensitive information, such as plans to respond to an active shooter. But sharing nonsensitive information, such as policies, procedures, and statistics about police activity, enables community members to examine police operations and evaluate departmental practices and policies,[iv]which increases accountability, legitimacy, and trust.
Video footage, whether from BWCs or dashcams, can potentially play a valuable role in policing by providing direct evidence of police-community interactions, but departments should implement fair and transparent standards for its use.[v]BWC policies, in particular, should be written with input from the community to ensure they are carefully regulated to minimize their potential use as tools to surveil communities of color.[vi]
[i]Leadership Conf. on Civil and Human Rights, Civil Rights Principles on Body Worn Cameras (May 2015), https://civilrights.org/civil-rights-privacy-and-media-rights-groups-release-principles-for-law-enforcement-body-worn-cameras/[hereinafter Leadership Conf. Principles].
[ii]Neill Franklin, The Marshall Project, The Video Doesn’t Lie – Even if the Officer Did (Oct. 16, 2018),https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/16/the-video-doesn-t-lie-even-if-the-officer-did.
[iii]President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 19–20 (2015), [hereinafter the President’s Task Force Report] https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
[iv]U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity 9 (2011),https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_police_Accountability_Oversight_and_Integrity.pdf (noting that “transparency, openness to scrutiny, integrity and legitimacy are also mutually reinforcing,” and “enhancing accountability can improve police legitimacy and increase public confidence”).
[v]Leadership Conf. on Civil and Human Rights, Civil Rights Principles on Body Worn Cameras (May 2015), https://civilrights.org/civil-rights-privacy-and-media-rights-groups-release-principles-for-law-enforcement-body-worn-cameras/.
[vi]Leadership Conf. on Civil and Human Rights, Civil Rights Principles on Body Worn Cameras (May 2015), https://civilrights.org/civil-rights-privacy-and-media-rights-groups-release-principles-for-law-enforcement-body-worn-cameras/.
Collecting and Sharing Data and Information
New technology allows police departments to easily retrieve, analyze, report, share, and store data and information about enforcement activity, such as stops, searches, citations (i.e., tickets), and arrests. Yet many police departments still rely on paper-driven methods to document and store data and information. This leaves departments (and the communities they serve) in the dark about operations and needs. For example, if leaders of a paper-driven department need to know how often officers used pepper spray against juvenile suspects, they have to search for this information manually — a task so burdensome they may not attempt it.
Electronic methods vastly simplify these tasks — but can nonetheless be improved. Some departments use separate database programs that don’t capture information consistently or integrate it with other data. They may, for example, use one database to record arrests and searches and another to record uses of force or misconduct complaints. Separate databases can make it difficult for officers to gather information, such as how often arrests or stops involve the use of force. If database systems aren’t or can’t be integrated, officers may have to collect this type of basic — and often essential — information by hand.
Several states mandate the release of data and information upon request.[i]Public disclosure laws are evolving to require police to release increasing amounts of information to the public (but usually only upon request). To obtain information, members of the public and news media must often go through a cumbersome and time-consuming process that can also be cost prohibitive (if departments charge for staff time to search for, review, and redact information).
Inefficient and burdensome processes can breed distrust among those who question police activity and have difficulty accessing information. New and emerging technologies allow for the collection and storage of vast amounts of information. Police should notuse these technologies to collect and store large amounts of data about members of the public. Gathering “big data” about “criminal” intelligence raises questions about lawful police and government surveillance, especially of communities of color and religious communities. Gang databases are especially concerning because police officers can enter people’s names into them (without notification) based on “gang identifiers” such as wearing a particular baseball hat, having a certain tattoo, or being seen with a known gang member.[ii]
In essence, there is a significant risk that people will wrongly end up in these databases, based on innocuous signifiers or conduct, and face negative consequences (e.g., wrongful arrest or deportation). Indeed, a 2016 audit of California’s gang database found the names of more than 40 infants who had been designated as gang members.[iii]Communities should advocate for legislation that mandates notification when people are included in a gang database so they can challenge it. California has such a law, and it provides processes for challenging inclusion.[iv]
Predictive policing technologies purport to allow departments to “forecast crime” before it occurs and identify “future criminals”[v]via algorithms that analyze data. However, the very data used to “predict crime” is often biased because officers themselves may have biases that manifest in the data they collect.[vi](For more detail, see Chapter 2.) What’s more, departments sometimes obtain these technologies without notifying the public or developing policies to regulate their use, which is in contravention with the best practice of seeking community input before adopting new technologies.[vii]
Police departments can strengthen relationships with communities and with the broader public by making information about police activity easily accessible.[viii]Data paint a full picture of department practices and challenges, which enables officers and community members to better understand police activity and to have collaborative, informed conversations about it.
[i]See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 6250 et. seq.; Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56 et. seq.; see alsoDan Freedman, Connecticut to Share Police Profiling Data, Conn. Post, May 2, 2018, https://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Connecticut-to-share-police-profiling-data-12882727.php(discussing the Connecticut Governor, Dannel Malloy’s announcement that the state intends to “enlist in a nationwide bid to share law enforcement racial profiling data it collects from individual police departments and state police”); see generallyBryan Arnold, A Survey of Public Records Laws—Issues Affecting State and Local Contractors, Bidders, and Contractors, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/PC500000/relatedresources/A_SURVEY_OF_OPEN_GOVERNMENT_LAWS.pdf(including a survey of state public record laws); see also Jessica Barker, Building Trust through Data Transparency, Officer.com, July 31, 2017, https://www.officer.com/command-hq/technology/computers-software/blog/12355227/building-trust-through-data-transparency.
[ii]Thomas Nolan, The Trouble with So-Called “Gang Databases”: No Refuge in the “Sanctuary”, American Constitutional Society Blog (June 27, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-trouble-with-so-called-gang-databases-no-refuge-in-the-sanctuary/;see alsoJoshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 115, 142 (2005).
[iii]Bianca Bruno, Challenge to CalGang Database Lands in Court, Courthouse News Service (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/challenge-to-calgang-database-lands-in-court/.
[iv]Fair and Accurate Gang Database Act of 2017, 2017 Cal. Stat. 91, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB90.
[v]Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1109, 1114 (2017), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6306&context=law_lawreview.
[vi]Victoria McKenzie, The Dirty Data Feeding Predictive Police Algorithms, The Crime Report (Aug. 18, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/18/does-predictive-policing-mathwash-bias/.
[vii]SeeACLU, Community Control Over Police Surveillance, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance(last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
[viii]Jessica Barker, Building Trust through Data Transparency, Officer.com, July 31, 2017, https://www.officer.com/command-hq/technology/computers-software/blog/12355227/building-trust-through-data-transparency.
Best Practices in Data, Information, and Video Footage
Collecting and sharing data improves transparency by allowing communities to see what officers and departments are doing.
Transparency is a critical component of trust. Collecting and sharing data improves transparency by allowing communities to see what officers and departments are doing, which enables community members to hold them accountable. When collecting and sharing data, departments should not collect private information (such as personal characteristics, associations, or activities)[i]or use technologies that risk infringing on civil and human rights.
To play a valuable role in policing, as dashcams do, BWCs should have strict policies in place regulating their use.[ii]As more departments adopt BWCs to increase accountability and transparency, they should implement policies to ensure they achieve those goals.[iii]Doing so may enable departments to use BWCs in a manner that respects and protects civil and human rights by increasing transparency. Indeed, some departments report that BWCs “have made their operations more transparent to the public and have helped resolve questions following an encounter between officers and members of the public.”[iv]They also have the potential to increase officer professionalism, allow departments to evaluate officer performance, and reduce the number of civilian complaints.[v]
That said, BWCs increase accountability only when properly used. If policies regulating how and when to use them aren’t in place, BWCs can result in disproportionate surveillance and enforcement of heavily policed communities of color, or religious or immigrant groups, raising significant privacy concerns.
Communities and departments should also consider the costs involved in the purchase and maintenance of BWCs. In assessing the overall cost of a BWC program, communities should take into account not only the cost of the hardware but also the cost of maintaining the footage and data, such as by cloud-based storage services. Thus, even if a department receives the hardware by grant or other means (e.g., some equipment manufacturers provide the equipment free if departments “rent” their cloud storage space), additional costs remain.[vi]
[i]See, e.g., Inside Privacy, Covington & Burling LLP, Virginia Supreme Court Holds that Police License Plate Readers Collect Personal Information (May 7, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/litigation/virginia-supreme-court-holds-that-police-license-plate-readers-collect-personal-information/; Va. Code § 2.2-3801 (2018), https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter38/section2.2-3801/(defining personal information to include social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, education, medical history, ancestry, religion, political ideology criminal record, or information from which personal characteristics such as finger and voice prints can be inferred); Neal v. Fairfax Cty. Police Dep’t, 812 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 2018).
[ii]See generallyLeadership Conf. on Civil and Human Rights, Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/pdfs/LCCHR%20and%20Upturn%20-%20BWC%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf.[hereinafter Leadership Conf. Scorecard].
[iii]See generallyLeadership Conf. on Civil and Human Rights, Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/pdfs/LCCHR%20and%20Upturn%20-%20BWC%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf.
[iv]Linsday Miller & Jessica Tolliver, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services & Police Executive Research Forum, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned 5 (rev. 2017), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf.
[v]Linsday Miller & Jessica Tolliver, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services & Police Executive Research Forum, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned 5 (rev. 2017), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf.
[vi]Josh Sanburn, The Company that Makes Tasers Is Giving Free Body Cameras to Police, Time, Apr. 5, 2017, http://time.com/4726775/axon-taser-free-body-cameras-police/.