Recommended Best Practices
Recommendation 7.12 Expand the role of community/civilian oversight bodies and independent monitors in discipline.
When departments receive a complaint from an officer or community member, they should apply efficient and just mechanisms for conducting investigations and handing down discipline. To build community trust and amplify community voices, jurisdictions should involve nondepartment personnel such as independent investigators, community/civilian review boards, and independent monitors or auditors in the disciplinary process.
Oversight bodies such as community/civilian review boards signal to members of the community that they have the power to affect outcomes in instances of serious misconduct. But to conduct a meaningful investigation, these individuals and entities require appropriate expertise, adequate staff and funding, and clearly defined roles. This requires a serious commitment of resources, as at the Office of Police Complaints (OPC) in Washington, D.C. Since 2001, the OPC has been staffed with personnel who receive and investigate public complaints regarding key areas of misconduct, including harassment, inappropriate language or conduct, retaliation, unnecessary or excessive force, discrimination, and officers’ failure to identify themselves during interactions.[i]
In a similar vein, the City of Las Vegas maintains an independent CRB tasked with investigating public allegations of police misconduct and deaths in police custody. The Las Vegas CRB not only has the authority to recommend whether allegations should be sustained but also to recommend, in light of an officer’s prior record, the appropriate level of discipline.[ii]By contrast, entities that focus on structural or big-picture review, such as independent auditors or monitors, may not play a role in the investigation and outcome of a particular event but may have the potential to have a broader impact on the police department as a whole.
Regardless of the entity, departments should work with communities to ensure that individuals involved have the requisite expertise to review complicated matters involving proper police conduct. Jurisdictions that implement community review mechanisms may require their oversight practitioners to attend trainings and obtain certification from organizations such as the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement or the Association of Local Government Auditors.[iii]Participation in these associations also allows oversight practitioners to tap resources and build networks through which to develop best practices. And because expertise only goes as far as the resources provided, jurisdictions should compensate investigators rather than rely on volunteers. Independent review entities include:
- Independent investigatory agencies.Independent investigatory agencies are not part of a department but are authorized to oversee or participate in the investigations of individual officers. They differ from civilian review boards in that they participate in actual investigations and can have subpoena power or other investigatory tools to support thorough investigations.
The advantage of independent agencies is that investigators who conduct the investigations and fact-gathering aren’t affiliated with departments. Chicago Office of Police Accountability (COPA), which is staffed entirely by civilian personnel who investigate complaints and make disciplinary recommendations to the chief of police.[iv]The Seattle Office of Police Accountability is also an independent agency that conducts investigations, though it employs a hybrid of sworn and civilian personnel.[v]
But the mere existence of an adequately funded independent investigative agency will not necessarily result in impartial investigations. Politics in most cities and towns run deep and, without institutional firewalls, can influence purportedly independent investigations.
For example, a 2017 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation of the Chicago Police Department found that COPA’s predecessor, the Independent Review Authority, had substantial, persistent integrity weaknesses in its investigations.[vi]The city now works to ensure COPA operates in an environment free of political pressures and undergirded by additional checks and balances to ensure thorough, impartial investigations.
- Community/civilian review boards. A community/civilian review board is an external entity that plays a role in the police disciplinary process. There are two types of review boards: (1) boards that review misconduct investigations and then adjudicate or make disciplinary recommendations (g., Cleveland’s Civilian Police Review Board); and (2) boards, such as Seattle’s Community Police Commission, that address broader police issues, such as whether departments’ internal disciplinary review processes achieve fair results, but do not review investigations.[vii]
There is a great deal of variation within these categories. Some review boards are funded to employ dozens of investigators, such as the above-described OPC in Washington, D.C., the Las Vegas Civilian Review Board, and Seattle’s Office of Police Accountability (OPA). Others, such as the Citizens’ Police Review Board in Albany, New York, are staffed entirely by volunteers.[viii]Another key difference among boards is how much weight departments accord the board’s recommendation. Most, including D.C.’s OPC and the Las Vegas CRB, are authorized to make recommendations rather than final determinations of officer discipline.[ix]
- Independent monitors/auditors. Some jurisdictions appoint an independent monitor or auditor to review departments’ overall performance across any of several areas, such as use of force, stops, misconduct investigations, and discipline. Independent monitors or auditors do not conduct investigations. Rather, they typically compile and examine data and then produce reports that include recommendations for improving existing policies or procedures.
Independent monitors or auditors should be assisted by a staff capable of conducting in-depth reviews and assessments.[x]Several jurisdictions have had successful monitors, such as the LAPD’s Inspector General and the Independent Police Review in Portland, Oregon.[xi]Such entities can also address individual cases requiring special attention. For example, the LAPD Inspector General’s Office includes a force investigations division that scrutinizes serious use-of-force incidents and that reports findings to the Board of Police Commissioners.[xii]
[i]D.C. Office of Police Complaints, About Office of Police Complaints, https://policecomplaints.dc.gov/page/about-office-police-complaints.
[ii]SeeLas Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t Citizen Review Bd., Policy and Procedure Manual, Section 3.13 Hearing Panel, at 7-10 (Mar. 2008), https://www.citizenreviewboard.com/Pages/Documents/CRB_Pol_amended_version2008.pdf.
[iii]SeeNat’l Ass’n for Civilian Oversight of Law Enf’t, Certified Practitioner of Oversight (CPO) Credential Program https://www.nacole.org/cpo_credential_program; Ass’n of Local Gov’t Auditors, Training, https://algaonline.org/index.aspx?NID=31.
[iv]Andrew Myerberg, Civilian Director, Seattle Gov’t, Office of Police Accountability, https://www.seattle.gov/opa.
[v]Andrew Myerberg, Civilian Director, Seattle Gov’t, Office of Police Accountability, Seattle’s Police Accountability System, https://www.seattle.gov/opa/seattle-police-accountability-system.
[vi]U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Atty’s Office, N.D. Ill., Investigation of the Chicago Police Department, at 48-74(2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download(describing systemic failures in the oversight body’s operations including failing to investigate complaints it deemed not serious enough to warrant a full investigation, and the failure to investigation certain types of force, such as Taser discharges and officer-involved shootings the result in a no hit, despite being required to.).
[vii]CompareN.Y.C. Gov’t, Civilian Complaint Review Bd., About CCRB, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/about.pageandCleveland, Office of Prof’l Standards & Civilian Police Review Bd., http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Government/CityAgencies/PublicSafety/OPS_PoliceReviewwithSeattle Gov’t, Cmty Police Comm’n, http://www.seattle.gov/community-police-commission.
[viii]Nat’l Ass’n for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Agency Profile-Albany, https://www.nacole.org/agency_profile_albany.
[ix]Nat’l Ass’n for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Who should make the final determination as to whether the allegations in a complaint should be sustained and what corrective actions, or disciplinary measures should be imposed?, https://www.nacole.org/final_determination (“few existing oversight agencies have the authority to make final determinations as to the outcome of an investigation.”); DC Office of Police Complaints, Policy Recommendations, https://policecomplaints.dc.gov/page/policy-recommendations; Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, Citizen Review Board, https://www.citizenreviewboard.com/; Andrew Myerberg, Civilian Director, Seattle Gov’t, Office of Police Accountability, OPA Complaint Process, http://www.seattle.gov/opa/complaint-process#stepfivediscipline.
[x] Police Assessment Resource Ctr., Nat’l Guidelines for Police Monitors 30-31 (2008), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/54d3b1eae4b07e4908f9ed64/1423159786656/Monitoring+Guidelines.pdf.
[xi] Office of the Inspector General L.A. Police Comm’n https://www.oig.lacity.org/ (housed on a different website than L.A. City, see Official Site of The LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, Office of the Inspector General http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/1076); Portland: City of Portland, Independent Police Review, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ipr/.
[xii] Office of the Inspector General L.A. Police Comm’n, Use of Force Section, https://www.oig.lacity.org/use-of-force-section.